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ABSTRACT 
This article addresses how the rules intended to protect consumers and taxpayers from economic 
crime, namely leniency and cartel settlements in competition law, criminal sanctions and debarment of 
suppliers from participation in public tenders for bribery, work together. While the economic 
reasoning behind these rules makes sense when considering each one of them in isolation, their impact 
is weaken when they are opposing each other. Competition authorities are narrowly mandated to 
control competition, and they do not seek out corruption. For criminal law investigators problems are 
created if they interfere (because it would undermine the leniency program); conversely, there are 
problems if they stay away (because that would undermine enforcement of corruption and other 
economic crimes). We propose to strengthen the regulation of corporate misconduct through better 
collaboration and integration of the other law enforcement functions and institutions that exist. The 
first step is to maintain and share a centralized database on firms’ offenses and settlements with anti-
trust and procurement authorities. The second step is to expand the mandate and competence of 
competition authorities to search for, and react against, corruption.  
 
RESUME 
Cet article étudie comment les jeux de la règlementation, des contrôles et des sanctions destinées à 
protéger les consommateurs et les contribuables contre les abus des entreprises, à savoir les 
programmes de clémences et de procédures négociées dans le cas de lutte contre les ententes, et les 
sanctions criminelles et d’exclusion des marchés publics dans le cas d’affaires de corruption, 
interagissent. Prises séparément ces différentes régulations et sanctions semblent adaptées au problème 
qu’elles visent à traiter. Mais appliquées ensembles elles peuvent avoir des effets indésirables car 
contradictoires. Les autorités de la concurrence se concentrent sur les problèmes de collusion et d’abus 
de position dominante. Pour mettre à jour les ententes elles utilisent des programmes de clémences. Or 
ces programmes rentrent en conflit avec l’obligation d’exclure des marchés publics une entreprise qui 
s’adonne à la corruption ou participe à des ententes. Pour remédier à cet écueil nous proposons, d’une 
part, de centraliser l’information concernant les divers abus des entreprises, et d’autre part, d’élargir 
les prérogatives des autorités de la concurrence pour protéger les acteurs particuliers, non seulement 
contre les ententes et autres pratiques considérées comme anticoncurrentielles, mais également contre 
les cas de corruption. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Since the 1990s, governments have approved and implemented radical tools for the sake of protecting 
markets from illegal business behaviour. International conventions on corruption made it impossible 
for firms to justify their bribery for contracts by pointing to a foreign business culture. Most 
jurisdictions can prosecute and sanction suppliers for the bribes they pay in foreign markets, expenses 
that suppliers previously deducted from their taxes. Across the globe, politicians proclaim zero-
tolerance towards corruption, and at present, most countries have rules mandating that procurement 
agencies exclude corrupt suppliers from participating in tenders for public contracts. At the same time, 
competition authorities' enforcement against secret cartels has hardened, resulting in both all-time high 
fines and calls for increased use of imprisonment.3 Likewise, most competition-law regimes have 
introduced leniency or amnesty programmes, and these have revolutionized the detection of secret 
cartels, in combination with settlement mechanisms that provide expedient sanctioning of the 
infringements.   
Nevertheless, cases of corruption and various other forms of collusion continue to emerge, including 
for example the Petrobras/Lava Jato case in Brazil, the recently settled VimpelCom telecoms case 
involving corruption in Uzbekistan, and substantial fines imposed on players in the financial sectors, 
including HSBC Citigroup, Barclays and Deutsche Bank. International surveys of business 
representatives reveal a general perception that the challenges persist, while citizens in most countries 
have a diminishing, if not dismal trust in their governments’ ability to tackle the problem. Why is this 
the case, given the impressive progress made towards a harmonized legal platform for action against 
corruption and cartels?  
The desire to find an answer to this question motivated this article, which addresses how the 
aforementioned rules function in practice, and in particular, how they work together. What we find is 
that the governments, in their eagerness to incentivize self-reporting and keep the corrupt away from 
government contracting, largely ignored the question of the policy tools’ co-existence. Most of the 
policy initiatives were inspired by experiences from the United States, where they have a different 
institutional landscape than what is commonly found, for example, in Europe and in its former 
                                                     
2 Emmanuelle Auriol is Professor of Economics at the Toulouse School of Economics (emmanuelle.auriol@tse-
fr.eu); Erling Hjelmeng is Professor of Law at the Faculty of Law, University of Oslo (e.j.hjelmeng@jus.uio.no); 
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3 See for example the recent € 2.93 million fine imposed on truck manufacturers (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-16-2582_en.htm), and Wouter Wils: Is Criminalization of EU Competition Law the Answer? World 
Competition: Law and Economics Review, Vol. 28, No. 2, June 2005.  
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colonies. In most European countries, there are different institutions mandated to control different 
types of crime. In the United States, however, crime committed by firms to secure profits can – to a 
much larger extent – be investigated and sanctioned by one and the same government unit – typically 
the Securities and Exchange Commission in close collaboration with the Department of Justice, often 
with all concerns addressed in an out-of-court settlement process.  
Therefore, while the economic reasoning behind the radical reforms mentioned above makes sense to 
many experts (who typically consider each one of them in isolation), the impact of the reforms may 
have been weaker than expected, simply because policymakers have failed to consider the interaction 
between the different tools. This possibility is what the article will examine in the following sections. 
The article does not intend to provide a detailed analysis of the state of the law in the EU member 
States. It does, however, point at general dysfunctions in the enforcement system adopted by most 
Member States with regard to the interaction between competition law, public procurement law and 
criminal law. As well, it defines a scope of improvement of the interaction between enforcement 
authorities.  
We begin with a brief presentation of the policy tools we have in mind: leniency and cartel settlements 
in competition law, criminal sanctions for bribery, debarment of suppliers from participation in public 
tenders, and eventually, private enforcement, such as private players’ opportunity to claim 
compensation for breach of rules regulating market behaviour. For each of them, we will pinpoint 
some challenges in their function vis-à-vis the others. Next, we summarize insights across the different 
policy tools and present an argument for a more coherent approach to corruption and cartels – before 
we turn to a discussion of the implications for the institutional landscape. However, the complexity of 
challenges associated with the interaction between different institutions and policy tools requires more 
insights than those we currently have, and as we discuss reforms, we will try to pinpoint some areas 
where more research is needed. We end the article with our conclusions.   
2. COMPETITION LAW  
Over the past decade, European competition law has undergone a rapid development in particular in 
two fields: mechanisms for the detection of covert infringements (leniency in cartel cases) and the use 
of negotiated settlements (cartel settlements and commitment decisions). Taken together, these 
developments have considerably changed the landscape of competition law enforcement in Europe.  
In considering competition law as such, we may truly call this development a success. Most cartel 
cases are detected because of leniency applications, and the high level of fines continues to increase 
the upside of applying for leniency.4 Moreover, the cartel settlements procedure is currently applied in 
a majority of cartel cases, providing for more expedient prosecution.5 The commitment procedure 
under Article 9 of Regulation No 1 is also regularly applied in cases where the promotion of 
competition is at issue.6 This has facilitated tailor-made remedies that effectively remedy competitive 
                                                     
4 See for example the recent truck manufacturer cartel, where the leniency applicant’s fine was reduced from 
approximatively €1.2 billion to zero, while the other cartel members were fined a total of € 2.93 billion. See 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2582_en.htm.  
5 The truck manufacturer's cartel was the 21th instance of cartel settlements since this option was introduced in 
2008. On the settlement procedure, see Flavio Laino & Elina Laurinen: The EU Cartel Settlement Procedure: 
Current Status and Challenges, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice (2013) 4 302-311. 
6 The commitment procedure was introduced by Regulation No 1/2003 Article 9, which vested the Commission 
with power to close a case on the condition of commitments on future behaviour from the undertakings involved. 
Such commitments are made legally binding on the undertakings, but involves no admission of guilt or a finding 
of an infringement. See the account given by the Commission in its communication Ten Years of Antitrust 
Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives, COM(2014) 453. For a critical 
perspective, see Georgiev: Contagious Efficiency: The growing Reliance on U.S.-Style Antitrust Settlements in 
EU Law, [2007] Utah L. Rev. 971, and Ehlermann/Marquis (eds.): Antitrust settlements under EC competition 
law, European Competition Law Annual 2008, Oxford 2010, with further references.  
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concerns and even promote increased future competition in the markets. The combination of an 
increased level of detection and more efficient remedies has clearly added to the success of European 
competition-law enforcement, evidencing the importance of incentive-based, ad hoc mechanisms 
framed in a coherent and consistent way according to the enforcement needs in a particular field of the 
law.7 
If one considers the close connection between competition law infringements and other crimes, the 
picture does appear more nuanced, however.8 First, when detection is considered, a successful 
competition-law leniency system may have an adverse impact on the detection of other crimes.9 This 
is so because when corruption and collusion co-exist in a particular case, a leniency application under 
the competition rules will trigger secrecy obligations and focus the case on the competition law 
infringement.  
To our knowledge, no European competition cases have led to prosecution for corruption. This 
suggests that competition-law regimes may induce competition authorities to disregard economic 
crimes other than competition-law infringements. Competition authorities in Europe are generally one-
purpose agencies specialized in competition law, with no responsibility to prosecute or report other 
crimes. In addition, rules on secrecy and other limitations on the use of evidence (see for example 
Article 12.2 and 28 of Regulation No 1) prevent competition authorities from pursuing (or letting other 
authorities pursue) related crimes. 
Considering prevention of future infringements, both commitment decisions as well as settlements 
have the potential for incentivizing compliance also beyond what is regulated by competition law, a 
function that, in theory at least,  is similar to the principles of "self-cleaning" in public procurement 
law, considered below.    
However, commitment decisions only address the competitive concerns and not the risk of future 
instances of corruption. The commitments typically accepted by the Commission are not aligned with 
the requirements for self-cleaning, with regard, for example, to establishing compliance programs and 
whistle-blowing procedures. As well, commitment decisions are normally not used in cases which 
may involve corruption. Settlements do not include prospective obligations at all.10 Consequently, 
competition-law remedies do not ensure future compliance with criminal law standards of corruption 
and other white-collar crimes.  
While innovative measures have been designed to deter cartels and ensure that remedies are tailored in 
order to promote effective competition in the future, there may have been adverse effects on the 
detection and prevention of corruption and other economic crimes. Competition authorities are 
narrowly mandated to control competition, and they will not seek out corruption. In fact, competition 
authorities are disinclined to investigate corruption. For criminal law investigators this situation 
resembles a Catch 22 puzzle; problems are created if the authorities interfere (because it would 
                                                     
7 One may, however, question the internal coherence of the current detection mechanisms and remedies of 
European competition law. See for a discussion Erling Hjelmeng, Competition Law Remedies – Striving for 
Coherence or Finding New Ways, CMLRev. (2013) 1007- 1037. See further the Commission’s report Ten Years 
of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives COM (2014) 453. 
8 See Ariane Lambert-Mogliansky. Corruption and collusion: strategic complements in procurement. In S. Rose-
Ackerman and T. Søreide (eds.) International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Volume Two. Edward 
Elgar Publishing (2011). 
9 Discussed in Tina Søreide, Corruption and Criminal Justice: Bridging Economic and Legal Perspectives 
(Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham, UK, and Northampton, MA, 2016), pp 100-101. 
10 According to the Commission's website, "a settlement decision simply requires a 'cease and desist' of past 
behaviour, whereas commitments decision requires commitment to future behavior."  
(http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/legislation/cartels_settlements/settlements_en.html).  
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undermine the leniency program); conversely, there are problems if they stay away (because that 
would undermine enforcement of corruption and other economic crimes).11  
Eventually, although negotiated remedies are becoming increasingly important in European 
competition law, these are focused on competition law and the potential to combat other economic 
crimes is not reflected in its current use.  
3. DEBARMENT IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT  
As a further approach to protecting markets against corruption and collusion and to securing trust in 
public institutions, governments have decided to exclude suppliers from taking part in tenders for 
public procurement contracts if they have been involved in corruption (in the public or private sector) 
and some other offences; hence, the firms are debarred.   
The mandate for debarment was introduced in the EU Public Procurement Directive already in 2004 
and later amended in the 2014 directive.12 The directive of 2014 stipulates, as its predecessor, a 
combination of mandatory and facultative debarment. According to Article 57(1) and (3), 
“Contracting authorities shall exclude an economic operator from participation in a procurement 
procedure where they have established, by verifying in accordance with Articles 59, 60 and 61, or are 
otherwise aware that that economic operator has been the subject of a conviction by final judgment 
for one of the following reasons: ... .” The reasons then listed in the Article includes participation in a 
criminal organization, corruption, fraud, terrorist offences, money laundering or terrorist financing, 
and child labour. It should be noted that debarment is warranted even if the procurement agency is 
merely “otherwise aware” of such offences, which means that a supplier can be excluded on a strong 
suspicion of crime; a court verdict is not required. The US Government applies a similar rule and so 
do the largest development banks, including the World Bank.13   
To what extent can we expect debarment to make a difference? By excluding illegitimate suppliers, 
governments hope to improve the level of integrity in markets for procurement contracts and deter 
crime in the longer run. At the same time, the more suppliers they keep out of markets, the more the 
rule harms competition. Will the benefits associated with debarment always weigh up against the 
costs?  
Let us consider the debarment rule ceteris paribus, with a focus on how it works to deter corruption in 
a closed market with a significant risk that procurement agents are corrupt – a setting studied by 
                                                     
11 Insufficient coordination across the law enforcement institutions can be a problem also in contexts where 
cartel collaboration is criminalized. While a competition authority investigates competition law crime and 
reports individuals involved in the case to the public prosecutor, the public prosecutor in turn may be blocked 
from relying on the evidence for pursuing other crimes. 
12 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public 
procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ 2014 L 94/65. We have described the rules in more detail 
in Erling Johan Hjelmeng and Tina Søreide. Debarment in Public Procurement: Rationales and Realization. In 
(Eds) GM Racca and C. Yukins (2014:215-32). 
13 Regarding international organizations, see N. Seiler and J. Madir, Fight against Corruption: Sanctions 
Regimes of Multilateral Development Banks, in Journal of International Economic Law, 2012, 5-28; and P. H. 
Dubois – A. E. Nowlan, Global administrative law and the legitimacy of sanctions regimes in international law, 
in S. Rose-Ackerman & Carrington: Anti-Corruption Policy: Can International Actors Play a Constructive 
Role?, 2013, Carolina Academic Press, Durham NC, 201-214.  Tina Søreide, Linda Gröning and Rasmus 
Wandall. An efficient anticorruption sanctions regime? The case of the World Bank. The Chicago Journal of 
International Law 16 (2): 523-552. For the collaboration between development banks, and how debarment by 
one leads to debarment by the others, see Frank Fariello and C.C Daly. Coordinating the Fight against 
Corruption among MDBS: The Past, Present, and Future of Sanctions. George Washington International Law 
Review, 45, 253 (2013).  
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Auriol and Søreide (2015).14 If detected, the debarment rule implies exclusion of a supplier that has 
paid a bribe while the consequences for the procurement agent is kept constant (Article 57 says 
nothing about the procurement agents). A corrupt procurement agent directs contracts towards 
suppliers who have offered a bribe, opting for sole-source procurement instead of organizing a fair 
competitive tender.  
For each supplier, the net benefit of offering a bribe at the risk of being detected, and then debarred, 
depends on the number of competitors as well as the perceived value of obtaining government 
contracts in the future. With many competitors, it is difficult for each one to secure a contract. 
Marginal revenues are very close to marginal costs, and the situation, should they be excluded, is not 
very different from being an eligible bidder; the private sector demand keeps them alive. When there is 
not much to gain from honest competition, the profits from securing a contract through bribery easily 
outweigh the risks.  
In this scenario, one might imagine the rule – applied as stipulated by the Directive – eliminates the 
competitors one by one, while corrupt procurement agents can continue to take bribes. In fact, the 
fewer suppliers left in the market, the higher the bribes they can take, because each supplier has more 
revenues to share as a result of their stronger market position. This means, for the procurement agents, 
that corruption becomes increasingly more attractive. In contrast, for the firms that obtain more profits 
the more competitors the government excludes, the consequences of debarment begin to matter. Under 
the given assumptions, it is clear that debarment will not deter firms from bribery unless the 
competition is already constrained.  
However, as follows from the most basic oligopoly theory, if competition is already constrained, one 
cannot exclude another competitor without harming the price-quality combination. With fewer 
suppliers, there is also a heightened risk of excluding a supplier that provides essential products or 
services with few if any substitutes. What is more, the fewer the number of suppliers remaining in the 
market, the easier it is for them to collude; they can operate a cartel. 
To what extent can we expect debarment to deter cartel collaboration? What if cartel collaboration is 
added to the Article 57 reasons that justify debarment, as is the case already in World Bank 
procurement regulation? Would that ensure the debarment rule’s preventive effects, including in cases 
of few bidders and a high risk of collusion? It is a possible option. There are few examples of 
development banks debarring suppliers found guilty in cartel collaboration, but in the Philippines in 
2009, all the seven road construction companies involved in a bid-rigging scheme for World Bank-
financed contracts were in fact debarred.15 However, in most cases, the exclusion of all the suppliers 
from a public procurement market harms society too much and therefore is generally not advisable. 
Instead, the procurement agency could debar the ringleader or responsible directors.  
The risk of facing a situation where all bidders have been involved in crime justifying debarment is in 
fact present also under the EU procurement directive. As Ariane Lambert points out, corruption 
facilitates cartels, and many cartels have survived because the suppliers had an insider on the side of 
the government procurement agency.16 In cases where both offences have happened, the government 
should debar all the colluding suppliers because they all have been involved in corruption. The 
difficulty associated with such a situation was illustrated in Brazil following the grand Lava Jato 
corruption scandal. By law, the country’s largest construction firms should be debarred from public 
contracting, while in practice, this proved difficult because their services were urgently needed. For 
                                                     
14 Auriol, Emmanuelle, and Tina Søreide. An Economic Analysis of Debarment. NHH Dept. of Business and 
Management Science Discussion Paper 2015/23 (2015). 
15 World Bank press release, January 14, 2009. The Philippine government's immediate reaction to the case 
raised suspicions that corruption could be part of the scam, as the president's response, widely quoted in the 
press, was, "We can always find another development bank." Case mentioned also by E. Auriol and T. Søreide, 
supra note 14. 
16A. Lambert-Mogiliansky. supra note 8.  
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the government, it was a choice between violating rules protecting markets from corruption (resulting 
in demonstrations against the government) and allocate contracts to the guilty firms for the sake of 
critically needed infrastructure (which, if not provided, would also lead to public outcry).  
In this section, we have reviewed conceptual difficulties with the debarment rule. The mechanisms 
discussed are consistent with the more noisy circumstance of an open, international market for public 
procurement contracts. What matters for the potential deterrent impact on firms, is the extent to which 
they are dependent on public procurement contracts, that is, how important the next contract might be. 
The easier another firm replaces a debarred firm, the weaker the tool’s effect on competition. If it has 
no impact in the market, and firms are not completely dependent on procurement contracts, it will 
have no impact on corruption.17 One can always argue that the objective of the rule is to send a clear 
signal that integrity matters and thereby generate trust in governmental spending decisions. The value 
of that signal is highly uncertain, however, if the players’ incentives remain unchanged, or – when the 
rule works as intended, it harms society by weakening competition or cutting important benefits.  
4. DEBARMENT IN PRACTICE  
Given the difficulties associated with debarment, it comes as no surprise that across Europe, the 
debarment rule is weakly enforced. There are several reasons why this is so. The following are three 
main concerns.18  
First, it is not sufficiently clear how the rule is to operate, because the Procurement Directive does not 
provide for a full harmonisation. Principles of equal treatment in the national legal orders limit the 
governments' opportunity to make exemptions from the rule on an ad hoc basis, and in that respect, 
deviation from the rule simply because a supplier has too strong a grip on the market is questionable. 
As well, the principle of proportionality implies that governments should not treat firms more harshly 
than necessary for the intended effect, and as discussed, the determination of what is necessary is far 
from clear.19  
This brings us to the second concern. The regulations are supposed to stipulate what it takes for 
suppliers to be re-accepted for public tenders. According to the EU Procurement Directive Article 57 
(6) and (7), “Any economic operator that is…<supposed to be debarred>… may provide evidence to 
the effect that measures taken by the economic operator are sufficient to demonstrate its reliability 
despite the existence of a relevant ground for exclusion. If such evidence is considered as sufficient, 
the economic operator concerned shall not be excluded from the procurement procedure.” The Article 
then instructs governments on how to assess, on a discretionary basis, whether a supplier has done 
what it takes to regain status as an eligible bidder, although governments must also determine the 
maximum period of exclusion from public tenders. A supplier found guilty in corruption will thus not 
necessarily have to take any steps to become trustworthy; the supplier can regain trust simply by 
waiting until the debarment period is over.    
The third concern is that the rules are seemingly developed on the assumption that procurement agents 
are (always) honest. In practice, the procurement agents are the ones who determine whether a supplier 
is eligible for participation in a tender. They decide whether suspicion of criminal activity should lead 
to exclusion, whether a firm has done what it takes to become trustworthy – such as dismissing a 
member of management, introducing a whistle-blowing regime, or simply stayed out in the cold for a 
sufficiently long time. If these rules are motivated by the risk of corruption in public procurement, 
                                                     
17 For more explanation and analysis, see E. Auriol and T. Søreide (2015), supra note 14.  
18 Several of the following arguments were discussed also by Erling Johan Hjelmeng and Tina Søreide, see supra 
note 12. 
19 Previously discussed by E. Hjelmeng and T. Søreide, supra note 12. 
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why are procurement agents given such large leeway for discretion? Alas, in many contexts, the very 
same rules forbid procurement agents from assessing a bid based on the bidders’ past performance.20  
A further important reason why debarment is difficult to enforce is the fact that procurement agents do 
not have a specific registry of criminal suppliers. Unless procurement agents run a background check 
on bidders, debarment depends on information from the suppliers themselves or from competitors who 
are aware of the facts. In many cases, it is even difficult to determine what members in a group are 
parts of the same company. While it may be clear that one country office of a large international 
company is guilty in bribery, it is less clear whether all the branches of the company and subsidiaries 
should be excluded as well. Very large suppliers are simply too important to be excluded, and in such 
cases, the matter might be settled with the firm making an extra payment (such as Siemens $100 
million to the World Bank) or take some other step that implies a cost while the firm’s supply 
continues.21  
Despite the many challenges, policymakers keep referring to debarment as a powerful policy 
instrument against corruption.22 While it sounds like a good idea to exclude dishonest suppliers, 
debarment works poorly in practice, partly because it has not been well designed, and partly because it 
is not well administered and coordinated with other tools intended to protect markets.   
5. CRIMINAL LAW  
At the turn of the new millennium, several ratification processes pertaining to important international 
conventions on corruption were initiated and signalled a new era of regulation for business integrity. 
Across the globe, most countries reformed their laws on corruption, a process that resulted in rapid 
criminalization of corruption and held the promise of rule harmonization.23  
The impact of the criminal law reforms are far from clear. While an overwhelming number of business 
climate estimates and governance indicators exist, none of these provide exact data on the extent of 
corruption, and while many of them correlate strongly, there are no strong reasons to conclude that we 
are about to rid ourselves of the problem.24 Following the reforms, there was an upsurge of business 
conferences addressing risks of corruption (and how firms avoid criminal liability), and it might have 
influenced some leaders’ moral compass and choices. While few business leaders seemed to care 
twenty years ago, todays’ leaders are informed about relevant rules and risks, including the 
responsibility they have to keep their organization on the right side of the law.  
                                                     
20 For discussion, see S.D. Gordon and R. O. Duvall. United States: It's time to rethink the suspension and 
debarment process. Holland & Knight 3 July (2013) and J. Crawford. How Proposed Debarment Became Equal 
To Suspension. Law 360 on 2 February 2015, see http://www.law360.com/articles/616957/how-proposed-
debarment-became-equal-to-suspension     
21 See Jessica Tillipman. A House of Cards Falls: Why 'Too Big to Debar' is All Slogan and Little Substance. 
Fordham Law Review Res Gestae 80.49 (2012). 
22 The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, for example, states that "as anti-corruption initiatives around 
the world gain momentum, one device for fighting corruption -- debarment, or blacklisting, of corrupt or 
unqualified contractors and individuals has emerged as an especially noteworthy tool." The same report 
maintains "suspension or debarment from public contracts has proven to be an effective tool in the fight against 
corruption" (UNODC 2013: 25) UNODC. Guidebook on anti-corruption in public procurement and the 
management of public finances. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.   
23 European governments criminalized corruption through their coordinated approval of the Council of Europe 
Criminal Law (2002) and Civil Law (2003) Conventions on Corruption. In parallel with that process in Europe, 
governments from all regions were persuaded to approve the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
(UNCAC) in 2003. In addition, the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions, which entered into force in 1999, gave governments the legal basis for 
reacting against corporations that pay bribes in foreign markets.  
24 For sources on the perceived extent of corruption, see chapter 2 in T. Søreide, supra note 9. For a review of 
consequences, see OECD. 2015. Consequences of Corruption at the Sector Level and Implications for Economic 
Growth and Development. Paris: OECD Publishing.  
9 
 
Some countries, for example France, have extended the scope of their provisions under criminal law, 
which includes a specific provision criminalising breaches of public procurement rules, known as 
‘délit de favoritisme’. The crime of "favouritism" implies for example that representatives of the 
public purchaser may be prosecuted for granting benefits to particular tenderers.25 Based on the 
jurisprudence, a breach of public procurement rules that cannot be qualified as corruption may still be 
punished as a ‘délit de favoritisme’.26 We do not, however, believe that the introduction of new crimes 
at the substantive level may remedy the general lack of coordination at the level of sanctions.  
In practice, those responsible for enforcing criminal law against business corruption face substantial 
challenges.27 Many prosecutors are constrained by limited resources and competence to take on 
complex cases of business-related financial crime. Political support for criminal law enforcement in 
corruption cases varies substantially across Europe and in most, if not all, countries, there are 
examples of serious law enforcement failure, especially in foreign bribery cases.28  
Prosecutors that lack the resources and the mandate to operate independently, high levels of proof 
regarding evidence, numerous grey zone forms of bribery and the international character of markets – 
with numerous ways of hiding ownership and legitimizing transactions– are factors that make it easy 
for business leaders to benefit from corruption without much risk of detection. Even in the cases when 
a company evidently has profited from bribery, it is far from certain that any employee will be subject 
to a criminal sanction. Investigators rarely manage to document a bribe, and even though the managers 
in command may have been negligent, prosecutors cannot necessarily prove the extent of gross 
negligence needed to impose criminal sanctions. Typically, the evidentiary requirements under 
criminal law far exceed what evidence investigators can possibly provide in these kind of cases.  
This leads us to the growing trend among criminal justice systems to “incentivize” firms to report their 
own crime, inspired by the kind of plea-bargaining that is much applied in the United States.29 
Through self-reporting, collaboration, and corporate leaders’ commitments to never again commit 
such a crime, firms – increasingly –  are given the opportunity to bargain down their charge and 
sentence, as well as other aspects, such as how much information to share with the public.30  Across 
countries, the exact rules – if any official guidelines regulating such bargains exist at all – go in all 
directions, and apart from in the United States, they are far from predictably enforced.  
While these settlements are steps in the direction of a system with compliance-based defence often 
seen as compatible with economic theory on optimal deterrence, they are not well aligned with the 
principles behind debarment rules in public procurement.  
                                                     
See Article 432-14 of the French Code Pénal. The crime of "favouritism" and its relationship with competition 
law and the crime of corruption is discussed in the French contribution to the 2014 OECD Roundtable Fighting 
Corruption and Promoting Competition, see DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2014)52 
(http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2014)52&docL
anguage=En).  
26 The SCPC (Service Central de Prévention de la Corruption) noted that between 2007 and 2010, no one served 
a prison sentence on the basis of this provision; there were 25 convictions that resulted in a suspended prison 
sentence and 20 cases in which fines were applied. The fines ranged from EUR 2 333 to 5 333 (see the EU Anti-
Corruption Report, annex 10 France). http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-
crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption/anti-corruption-report/docs/2014_acr_france_chapter_en.pdf 
27 For a summary of enforcement challenges, see Erling Hjelmeng and Tina Søreide: Bribes, Crimes and Law 
Enforcement, University of Oslo Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2016-07 
(http://ssrn.com/abstract=2742770), forthcoming in European Business Law Review. 
28 The OECD evaluates country performance when it comes to the enforcement of their foreign bribery 
legislation. For a systematic review of law enforcement obstacles, see Søreide (2016), supra note 9, chapter 3.  
29 Other names for similar arrangements with corporations are compliance-based defense, negotiated settlements, 
duty-based liability regimes, and negotiated or deferred prosecution agreements (N/DPAs).  
30 For a study of eight European jurisdictions’ rules and practices regarding such bargains, see Abiola O. 
Makinwa, (Ed) Negotiated Settlements for Corruption Offences: A European Perspective. The Hague: Eleven 
Publishing. 
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The lack of a strategy for co-existence affects both functions. With no other instructions, criminal law 
enforcers will easily consider debarment in public procurement as so direct a consequence of a 
criminal sanction that they will reduce the criminal sanction accordingly, or be persuaded to do so in 
the negotiations with the offender for a settlement. In a Norwegian supreme court case brought against 
the firm Norconsult, the court even included the risk of debarment from public procurement (and the 
damage this would cause the company) as one of few weighty factors opposing corporate criminal 
liability in a case involving bribery in Tanzania; the case resulted in individual liability only.31  
In terms of debarment, the impact is clearly watered down if procurement agents refer to negotiated 
settlements under criminal law as evidence of a corrupt suppliers’ successful ‘self-cleaning’. As the 
use of such settlements increase, the entire debarment tool will be set out of function. It becomes a 
theoretical concept with no practical application, which is what our quick review of enforcement 
problems seems to suggest has already happened.32  
6. TORT LAW/ CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION  
Under both competition law and in the context of corruption, calls have been made for more private 
enforcement, as well as several legislative initiatives.33 Private enforcement in this context refers to 
compensating victims (typically customers having paid a supra-competitive price when purchasing 
goods or services from cartel members), in the form of the payment of damages. In addition to 
compensating victims, the involvement of private parties may supplement public enforcement; first, 
because private parties claiming to be injured may release valuable information to the authorities; 
second, because private action serves to terminate infringements; and finally, because private damages 
suits may constitute an important deterrent factor.34 
The interaction between public and private enforcement, and especially the borderline between 
competition-law infringements and corruption, have been explored to a very limited extent. For 
example, promotion of more private enforcement in European competition law is focused on the 
protection of customers, facilitating follow-on suits in the aftermath of competition authorities' 
detection of secret cartels. However, as pointed out above, customers may not be as innocent as they 
would like to appear, and if they have been involved in corruption but have not been detected, this 
poses a challenge to the very idea of follow-on suits. Certain customers and their employees may 
certainly benefit from corrupt practices among their suppliers, e.g. in the form of kickbacks, 
advantages over other customers etc. Moreover, the ultimate consumer or citizen, who will often bear 
the final burden, is not compensated at all.  
 
Further, the need to fine-tune and coordinate the public remedies becomes even more complicated 
when considering private enforcement. In competition law, it is well known that liability in tort may 
adversely affect incentive mechanisms designed to promote reporting (as reporting may expose the 
undertakings to damages claims).35  
                                                     
31 HR-2013-1394-A, case no. 2012/2114), Norconsult: http://www.domstol.no/en/Enkelt-domstol/-Norges-
Hoyesterett/Summary-of-Recent-Supreme-Court-Decisions/Summary-of-Supreme-Court-Decisions-2013/ 
32Among the 427 cases of criminal law reaction against foreign bribery that took place in the period 1999 to 
2014, according to the OECD, only two cases resulted in some form of debarment from public procurement. 
OECD. OECD Foreign Bribery Report: An Analysis of the Crime of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials. Paris: 
OECD Publishing (2014). 
33 Council of Europe Civil Law Conventions on Corruption (2003) and Directive 2014/104/EU on antitrust 
damages actions ([2016] OJ L 349/1). See further Wouter Wils: The Optimal Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law: 
Essays in Law and Economics, Kluwer Law, 2002, Chapter 8. 
34 See for an account of the function of different legal remedies Erling Hjelmeng and Tina Søreide: Bribes, 
Crimes and Law Enforcement, University of  Oslo Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series 
No. 2016-07 (http://ssrn.com/abstract=2742770), forthcoming in European Business Law Review, Table 4 and 
accompanying text.  
35 A similar effect may follow from debarment rules: if a successful leniency application exposes the undertaking 
to debarment; see this paper’s Section 2 on competition law.  
11 
 
 
This calls for a more systematic approach to private enforcement, where the legal rules should 
promote compensation of the ultimate victims, while at the same time avoiding adverse effects on 
public enforcement. The shielding of successful leniency applicants from joint and several liability 
under the competition law damages directive (Article 11.4) may be seen as such step (although in the 
view of these authors  this does not go far enough – successful leniency applicants should have been 
shielded from any liability). As well, the directive's presumption of cartel damages and passing-on 
(Articles 14 and 17) promotes compensation. Similarly, Article 57 (6) of the EU's Public Procurement 
Directive (2014/24/EU) provides an example of how public enforcement mechanisms may promote 
compensation to victims, as successful self-cleaning is made conditional upon the payment of 
compensation. In light of the challenges posed by the application of traditional tort law, compensation 
should arguably be better integrated into public enforcement.36 
 
The mechanisms in the EU directives briefly described above, however, amount only to small steps in 
the forging of a consistent regime ensuring compensation while at the same time securing desistance 
and promoting deterrence. The first step is to consider the compensatory function across the dividing 
line between competition law and debarment for corruption in public procurement. 
7. THE NEED FOR A MORE COHERENT APPROACH  
When one takes into account each of the aforementioned law enforcement tools and how each 
typically functions in European countries, it becomes evident that they are not the result of one 
coherent enforcement arsenal. With the lack of a coherent understanding of how the tools work 
together, their impact easily becomes arbitrary, and we have explained how none of the policy tools 
considered seem particularly well adapted for co-existence with the others.37  
There is also a mismatch between the purpose of laws and their expected function, especially because 
governments define and regulate corruption in criminal law. This set of rules was developed for the 
regulation of crime committed by (guilty) individuals, and as discussed, there are obvious 
shortcomings in criminal law regulation vis-à-vis corporations – including the strong presumption of 
innocence. At the same time, there is significant hesitation in criminal justice systems to depart from 
fundamental criminal justice principles, and hence a certain resistance to modifications that make the 
law more applicable for corporate misconduct. For example, in many countries, the introduction of 
leniency mechanisms known from competition law is far from straightforward. However, removing 
corruption and corporate misconduct from criminal law regulation is not necessarily a good solution. It 
would be seen as a step back from the impressive anticorruption reform process around the turn of the 
millennium and would signal a lower degree of seriousness associated with the offences, weakening 
the tools available for investigation.  
A more sensible solution is to strengthen the regulation of corporate misconduct through better 
collaboration and integration of the other law enforcement functions and institutions that exist.38 
Governments need to make sure that the different tools work together, in the same direction, instead of 
opposing each other. As a minimum, the different law enforcement institutions need to consider 
                                                     
36 It should be noted that the European Commission over several years have tried to promote private enforcement 
of the competition rules, see e,g, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/index.html. Guidelines 
have also been issued at the national level, see e.g. the guidelines issues by the French Ministry of Economic 
Affairs: http://www.economie.gouv.fr/dgccrf/L-action-civile-en-reparation-des-pratiques-antico.  
37 Following a Roundtable on Collusion and Corruption in Public Procurement, the OECD concluded already in 
2010 with a need for closer collaboration between enforcement agencies, precisely because the offences occur in 
tandem. See OECD DAF/COMP/GF(2010)6 page 11: “Co-operation between the various national enforcement 
strategies with jurisdiction of collusion and corruption in public procurement is paramount, in order to achieve a 
coherent overall strategy and ensure its full implementation, and additionally, to facilitate efficient prosecution 
of these offences” (). 
38 On this point, mention should be made of the French Commercial Code Article 463-5, which provides for 
exchange of information between public prosecutor and the competition authority, on request of the latter.  
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various possible reactions following detected corporate misconduct, and align their own reactions in a 
planned, principled and strategic manner. It would help if governments would maintain and share with 
one other a centralized database on firms’ offenses and settlements with anti-trust and procurement 
authorities. Collecting information at a central level would strengthen the coordination process among 
the different agencies and policies.   
In our opinion, however, this will not be sufficient to ensure efficient protection of markets against 
corporate misconduct. In addition, we think it is necessary to expand the mandate and competence of 
competition authorities. Despite the obvious fact that corruption threatens competition, these 
institutions have – at present – no mandate to search for, or react against, corruption. 
Corporate crime, conducted for the sake of securing corporate profits, needs regulation that implies a 
very close collaboration between competition control and criminal law enforcement. As a result, 
competition authorities should not need to worry about the consequences for the leniency mechanism 
if a case also involves corruption. The assessment of whether a firm is eligible to submit public (and 
private?) tenders, should be conducted as a one holistic reaction following reported or otherwise 
detected corporate misconduct. Consequently, criminal law enforcers should not need to worry about 
the additional consequences of a criminal sanction for public procurement markets. Procurement 
agents could concentrate on value for money and price-quality combinations, not the moral character 
of those behind the firms bidding for a contract, and they could choose suppliers from the pool of 
suppliers not listed in an (accessible) registry of debarred suppliers.39 Accordingly, the decision to 
exclude a supplier should not be up to the procurement agents, but instead, follow the settlement 
process under the responsibility of a combined unit of enforcers whose main mandate would be to 
protect markets and fair competition against all forms of relevant threats.  
What we propose is to strengthen an existing institutional structure and the one that holds the most 
relevant competence. Competition authorities are already used to considering policy choices and 
reactions against corporate misconduct with a view to the trade-offs between market consequences and 
other policy aims, such as crime deterrence. Considering the function of markets, the impact of 
debarment would resemble the impact of a merger – a frequent matter of analysis for competition 
authorities; in certain settings, the costs to society will exceed the expected benefits. Such 
considerations will not imply a soft stand against corruption involving the most powerful corporations. 
What it could lead to, however, is more emphasis on other reactions than debarment from public 
tenders, including for example a criminal law process against managers involved in the corporate 
misconduct (which would need to be addressed by the criminal justice system), more external 
monitoring of the corporation, or high fines which would harm owners more than markets.  The idea 
of a merged law enforcement function would result in a regulation of corporate misconduct with more 
emphasis on the function of markets. The arrangement, which is not very different from the 
organization of law enforcement functions in the United States, would be ideal for considering all 
necessary aspects of a settlement process with corporate offenders. Ideally, the suggested arrangement 
should work at the international level, at least if it would have the function assumed in this discussion.  
In the necessary reform process and the establishment of an agency with extended prerogative, it 
would be important to consider all aspects of its new mandate in light of the observed measures of its 
performance. While the number of cases processed is an easily available performance indicator, there 
are other aims, such as the deterrent effect on market players and justice in the law enforcement 
process, that are harder to monitor. However, with a certain emphasis on the institutional checks and 
balances and protection of accused offenders’ opportunity to appeal in the court system, concentration 
of authority should not need to reduce governance legitimacy. One particular concern is associated 
with the extra authority associated with the self-cleaning requirements in public procurement and 
                                                     
39 Similar to the World Bank arrangement, see World Bank.  The World Bank Office of Suspension and 
Debarment: Report on Functions, Data and Lessons Learned (2015). 
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negotiated settlements under both competition law and criminal law. In practice, these arrangements 
are associated with vast discretion placed in one institutional unit, typically prosecutors or 
investigators who can stipulate what corporations should do to regain their status as trustworthy. The 
impact of using settlement processes would not necessarily be weaker if followed by some integrity 
control or guided by strict instructions.40  
A further requirement for succeeding with such an arrangement is funding. Corporate misconduct 
happens in advanced forms, using the newest forms of technology, while exploiting legal loopholes 
faster than it takes to mend/close them. Law enforcement agencies need the same level of competence 
and technology – and they need resources. Although governments voice the need for efficient 
enforcement, institutional reform of the sort we have suggested would be at high risk of being 
underfunded. 
There are many reasons why governments fail to give law enforcers the teeth they need, and the wish 
to keep space for some market distortions is one of them. Politicians may want to keep such space for 
the sake of favouring domestic industry and promoting domestic employment, but there are also less 
legitimate reasons, such as lobbyism, revolving door issues, corruption, and various forms of power 
hunts. Political independence combined with the necessary resources would be an essential condition 
for reform.  
8. CONCLUSION  
In this paper we have discussed how the lack of coordination between different public agencies that 
aim to protect citizens, consumers and tax payers from corporate misconduct lead to, at best, 
uncoordinated and inefficient enforcement of regulations, and at worse, counterproductive/conflicting 
actions that hamper the impact of law enforcement reactions and reduce trust in government 
institutions.  
Law enforcement mechanisms have to function predictably to have a clear deterrent effect. To make a 
difference, they need to improve players’ incentives for compliance and strengthen citizens’ trust in 
government.  
We have pointed out the need for institutional reform, with substantial emphasis on the protection of 
markets and more functional enforcement of regulations against corruption.  
Although we have also pinpointed serious risks associated with concentration of authority, we are 
convinced that across Europe, the risks associated with maintaining the status quo regulations are 
higher.   
 
 
                                                     
40 For a relevant discussion of the fundamental principle of separating the three functions of writing rules, 
investigating infringements, and evaluating the evidence and making a final judgment, introduced for the 
protection of firms and citizens against the government, see Jennifer Arlen. Prosecuting Beyond the Rule of 
Law: Corporate Mandates Imposed Through Deferred Prosecution Agreements. The Journal of Legal Analysis, 
NYU School of Law Public Law Research Paper No. 16-13. (2016).  
